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In Issue Two (Autumn 2002) of Think, Stephen Law (“Is it all relative?”) and Simon 
Blackburn (“Relatively speaking”) both argued against ethical relativism. If there’s any 
truth in relativism, it’s not easy to find or to formulate. But I’m going to try. Not because 
I’m certain that relativism is true, but because the sort of relativism I’m going to defend 
here has more going for it than a lot of people realise.  
 All relativism starts with disagreement; it wants to claim that what seems to be a 
disagreement is not really a disagreement. The quickest way to explain this is to say that 
the two people who are disagreeing are actually making claims that are each ‘true for 
them’. This is the kind of relativism Law and Blackburn discuss. I want to suggest two 
changes. First, instead of saying there is no disagreement, I will argue for a type of 
relativism that says there is a disagreement, but there doesn’t need to be one. I’ll argue 
that if we understand ethics better, we will want relativism to be true.  
 Second, Law and Blackburn don’t distinguish between different types of 
relativism. In particular, they believe relativism between individuals and relativism 
between cultures are similar. And so they argue that any form of relativism ends up 
saying that something can be right for me and wrong for you over any moral 
disagreement. But this is only true according to relativism between individuals. If cultural 
relativism is true, it is only disagreements between the ethical views of different cultures 
which are relative. There are loads of disagreements, for instance between individuals 
within one culture, which aren’t relative at all. I’ll argue for cultural relativism, which is 
much more plausible. 
 Relativism in ethics is already more attractive to many people than relativism 
about scientific claims. Since relativism starts with disagreement, we should look at the 
nature of disagreement in science and ethics. In particular, how we can understand what 
would explain an end to disagreement in each case? Whether or not we actually reach 
agreement on scientific or ethical matters is irrelevant here. The question is, if we did, 
how would we explain how that came about? With science, the best explanation would be 
that the scientific theories we have agreed upon represent how the world is – the world 
has guided our investigations, confirming or falsifying hypotheses through experiment, 
until we understood what the world is like. In ethics, this doesn’t seem to be true. To see 
this, we need to think more about ethical practices. 
 There are two ways of understanding ethical practices. We can either say that 
different cultures, with their different ethical practices, their different ethical concepts, 
their different ethical judgments, are all trying to get at the truth about ethics, just as 
scientists are trying to find out the truth about the world. Or we can say that ethical 
practices are simply part of a culture’s way of living. The relativist, of course, will say the 
latter. 
 Suppose that I am disagreeing with an Indian friend of mine, Rajiv, over whether 
it is right to put one’s parents in an old people’s home when they can no longer cope on 
their own. I am arguing that there is nothing wrong with it; he is arguing that it would be 
gross dereliction of duty. He cites the importance of the family, the wisdom old people 
can bring to one’s life, the reciprocal duty of care that gratitude for one’s childhood 
imposes; I cite the importance of individualism, the impossibility of sustaining the 
development of a career while being a carer, the loneliness of not being around one’s peer 
group. We can understand the reasons we cite, the social institutions they reflect (e.g. 
extended v. nuclear family), and the virtues of character we hold dearest (care v. 
independence) either as attempts to get at the ‘truth’ about how one should relate to one’s 
elderly parents, or as reflecting different practices cultures have developed in this regard. 
I think the latter is more persuasive. The most obvious explanation of our disagreement is 
that our views reflect the ethical practices of our respective cultures.  
 The idea that two cultures are both trying to find ‘the truth’ about ethics seems 
silly. In many, many cases, it doesn’t sit well with an understanding of the history of that 
culture and how its ethical practices developed. And since at least one culture is wrong, 
we would also need to explain why that culture had ‘got it wrong’: why couldn’t people 
in that culture see what was independently right and do that? This is a very awkward 
question. Relativism, however, understands ethical practices as part of a culture; ethical 
practices have developed to help people find their way around a social world. But there 
are many social worlds, many cultures, and they have developed different ways of doing 
things. And this is the crucial contrast with science, which investigates the one physical 
world. There is just one physical world which can guide scientific investigations towards 
agreement, but there is not just one social world which can guide ethical practices 
towards agreement. 
 Understanding ethics this way seems highly plausible to me. But because ethical 
practices are not tied to the one physical world in the same way science is, we cannot 
believe that ethical disagreements between cultures will be resolved by being guided by 
the way the world is. The question at stake between Rajiv and me over whether it is right 
to put one’s parents in an old people’s home is a question about which social world – 
which set of social institutions, forms of relationship, and traits of character – is better. It 
is not whether we might personally adopt the practice of the other (or something similar). 
Rather, it is whether either of our societies should condone or pursue the social 
transformation that would be necessary for our society to adopt the practice of the other. 
But where is the answer to this question going to come from? Each of us appeal to the 
reasons, the social institutions, relationships, and virtues of our own culture. These are its 
‘ethical resources’. A general definition might be: a culture’s ethical resources are 
whatever someone who lived in and was familiar with only that culture could use to talk 
about and understand ethical questions. (This may mean that, in the modern world, 
relativism is obsolete – the ethical resources of cultures have interpenetrated.) 
 If someone puts the argument I’ve just outlined to Rajiv and me, and we are 
persuaded by it, then we might start to be a little uncomfortable insisting on how right we 
are, and how wrong the other is. Our disagreement doesn’t seem quite so straightforward 
any more. Certainly, in a practical sense, we disagree. We cannot live according to both 
cultures at once; the two sets of ethical practices exclude each other. But how are we to 
respond to this? To continue to insist on our own positions, as we developed them, looks 
naïve and presumptuous. But to give up our ethical views is preposterous – the argument 
that got us to this position emphasises the importance of ethics for social life.  
 Of course, there are times when to accept that you live your way and I live mine 
will feel like giving up one’s ethical views. Blackburn, for instance, is concerned that 
relativism will leave us without resources to condemn ethical practices that are corrupt, 
ignorant, wishful, or evil. But I’m not sure of this. The relativism I’m defending does not 
claim that all social practices are acceptable, that no individual and no practice can be 
condemned. People do wrong all the time, and relativism does not pretend otherwise. But 
it claims that to condemn an action or practice as wrongful, one must use resources from 
within the culture to which that practice or individual belongs. The reasons given for its 
wrongness must be reasons that are available within the culture. And even a prevalent 
practice can often be condemned on these grounds, because reasons for change lie in the 
(perhaps marginalized) practices and consciousness of those who are being badly treated 
by that practice. Relativism, then, only applies when the reasons for a particular social 
world stem from within it while the reasons against it stem from outside that world, from 
a different culture. Relativism says that a practice is wrong if it is wrong for reasons 
available to that culture; and so, if you and I are from different cultures, a practice can be 
wrong for you and right for me. The reasons given are incommensurable, and it seems 
there are no further grounds for adjudicating their strength. 
  What if there are no resources within a culture with which to condemn some of 
its practices? If this is ever true, this is a problem for relativism, and possibly its 
downfall. But even here, the best answer is the most relativistic alternative to relativism. I 
said earlier that the question facing me and Rajiv is “which is the better social world?”. 
The difficulty with producing an answer is that arguments for each world come from 
within that world. But this doesn’t automatically mean that the arguments are different. 
Two cultures can independently arrive at the same values. And I think we have strong 
reason to believe that there are some values – very vaguely specified – which emerge 
from at least the vast majority of human cultures, for example, the values of human life, 
of care for dependents, of truth-telling. Where a social world simply flaunts ‘universal 
values’, there we might be able to say that it is not the better social world, and condemn 
it. This is a step away from relativism, but can only happen rarely, since the values at 
stake are almost universal. 
 But relativism is not, on the whole, undermined by ‘universal values’. First, these 
‘universal values’ emerge from within each culture, so the idea of appealing only to each 
culture’s ethical resources remains; second, the values are differently interpreted in each; 
and third, there is no universal way of ranking them. All-in-all, specific ethical practices 
are more than interpretations of ‘universal values’; they have much more detail and depth 
to them than that. And they support and embody many values that are not universal, and 
which cannot be, for they could not be realized at the same time – in any set of practices 
– as other non-universal values. And so we will be faced with two social worlds, both of 
which invoke these values but each of which contains ethical practices that are in conflict 
with the practices of the other world. And here relativism provides the most plausible 
analysis of the relation between the two social worlds. Relativism says each is acceptable 
in its place. Neither social world is better. There is no answer to the question Rajiv and I 
are discussing. We are both right – for our own cultures. 
 In summary: once we recognise this type of value pluralism and 
incommensurability, which we must when we understand the nature of ethical practices, 
relativism appears to be a very attractive option. All ways of living a human life are 
culturally specific, and these culturally specific ways cannot be co-ordinated into a single 
overarching way. A set of ‘universal values’ – values that emerge from almost every 
human culture – give us the grounds on which to say that some cultures are ethically 
bereft, and so clearly worse social worlds in which to live – from almost everyone’s point 
of view. But ‘universal values’ are insufficient to ground any way of life, for they are 
vague and indeterminate, while every way of life is specific and determinate. Whenever 
we wish to make an ethical evaluation, relativism points us to the resources available 
within a culture. But these resources are considerable, and we should not fear that 
morality will be undermined by this recognition. 
 Relativism is much more than simply encouraging toleration. It gives us insight 
into the human situation, and one that can provide some understanding of both toleration 
and its limits. It takes a step beyond tolerating alternatives which ‘we’ have no reason to 
condemn (as Blackburn and Law put it), for to consider just our own reasons is too 
narrow. It asks us to consider whether ‘they’ have reason to condemn it (and if it is a vile 
practice, they very often will). And so it encourages a particular form of inter-cultural 
ethical dialogue, and it accounts for the limits of such dialogue. Finally, it can give us 
confidence in our own ethical practices, even when they are different from the ethical 
practices of other cultures – for the difference is no longer a threat; but it does not 
encourage ethical complacency, because there may well be ways to make a social world a 
better social world by its own standards. 
 I said at the outset that I wan’t sure relativism is ultimately true. More accurately, 
I’m not sure that the position I’ve defended is ultimately a form of relativism. If we think 
seriously about ethical ‘development’ within cultures and about the interaction between 
‘universal values’ and specific ethical practices, perhaps just a few contenders for ‘best 
social world’ – for everyone – will emerge. And even if relativism is true, I’m not sure it 
applies anymore, since we can’t pretend that any culture has an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’ 
which are clearly distinct. But my aim was not to finally establish the truth of relativism, 
but to show how much truth there might be in it. Quite a lot, really. 
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